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Abstract
Although praised for their rationality, humans often make poor decisions, even in simple situations. In the repeated binary
choice experiment, an individual has to choose repeatedly between the same two alternatives, where a reward is assigned
to one of them with fixed probability. The optimal strategy is to perseverate with choosing the alternative with the best
expected return. Whereas many species perseverate, humans tend to match the frequencies of their choices to the
frequencies of the alternatives, a sub-optimal strategy known as probability matching. Our goal was to find the primary
cognitive constraints under which a set of simple evolutionary rules can lead to such contrasting behaviors. We simulated
the evolution of artificial populations, wherein the fitness of each animat (artificial animal) depended on its ability to predict
the next element of a sequence made up of a repeating binary string of varying size. When the string was short relative to
the animats’ neural capacity, they could learn it and correctly predict the next element of the sequence. When it was long,
they could not learn it, turning to the next best option: to perseverate. Animats from the last generation then performed the
task of predicting the next element of a non-periodical binary sequence. We found that, whereas animats with smaller
neural capacity kept perseverating with the best alternative as before, animats with larger neural capacity, which had
previously been able to learn the pattern of repeating strings, adopted probability matching, being outperformed by the
perseverating animats. Our results demonstrate how the ability to make predictions in an environment endowed with
regular patterns may lead to probability matching under less structured conditions. They point to probability matching as a
likely by-product of adaptive cognitive strategies that were crucial in human evolution, but may lead to sub-optimal
performances in other environments.
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Introduction
In economics, politics, and the social sciences, it is often
assumed that humans make rational decisions, especially in simple
situations that repeat themselves [1]. The so-called rational choice
theory models human beings as agents who go about achieving
their self-interested goals in the best possible way, maximizing
their expected utility [2]. This theory, often in conjunction with
game theory, is used to predict the behavior of individuals.
Yet consider a simple decision making task, wherein a subject
has to choose between two alternatives – a binary choice problem.
When asked to predict the next element in a sequence of coin
tosses, for instance, many people believe that the chance of getting
a tail increases after several heads in a row [3]. This belief, known
as the gambler’s fallacy, is incorrect and may lead to sub-optimal
performance.
Similarly, in a different task widely studied since the 1940’s [1]
and known as the repeated binary choice experiment, an individual has to
choose between two repeatedly presented alternatives and a
reward is randomly associated, with probability greater than 0.5
and lesser than 1, to one of the alternatives. For instance, at each
trial, a light may flash either on the left or on the right of a screen
and the subject is asked to predict which side the light will flash
and is rewarded if the prediction is correct. The side where the
light will actually appear is chosen by a computer program
independently at each trial, with a constant probability for each
side; for instance, the light may flash on the left with 2/3 (67%)
probability and on the right with 1/3 (33%) probability. This
makes it impossible to predict correctly all the time where the light
will flash. Instead, once the subject has realized the light flashes on
one side (the majority side) more frequently than on the other (the
minority side), the optimal strategy is to perseverate with choosing
the majority side. This strategy is called perseveration, and subjects
that perseverate will be correct on about two thirds (67%) of the
trials, which is the best anyone can do.
Human adults, however, don’t perseverate as a rule [1]. They
tend to choose a given side with about the same frequency with
which the light is flashed on that side. This strategy, known as
probability matching, is sub-optimal: in the previous example, subjects
that employ probability matching will be correct only in about five
ninths (56%) of the trials ((1/3)2+(2/3)2), one ninth (11%) below
perseveration (2/3= 6/9). Surprisingly, other animals such as rats
[4], monkeys [5], pigeons and fish [6] tend to perseverate,
maximizing their returns. Thus, in a repeated binary choice
experiment, human beings not only do not maximize their
expected utility, but they are also outperformed by rats and fish.
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It has been previously suggested that human subjects do
probability matching because they look for patterns or rules that
might be determining the sequence of outcomes [1,7]. Indeed,
when asked to describe what strategy they employed in the
experiment, they have themselves reported that they look for
patterns. In searching for a putative underlying pattern, humans
might be playing around with different alternatives, eventually
doing probability matching. However, evidence supporting this
view is sparse and indirect [8–14] and alternative explanations
have proliferated, such as mistaken mathematical intuition [15],
insufficient motivation and practice [16], adaptation to uncertainty
[17,18], adaptation to foraging in a competitive environment
[19,20], and probability matching as a consequence of nearly
optimal structure learning [21].
It could also be questioned how a sub-optimal behavior could
arise from evolutionary constraints favoring the selection of
cognitive resources capable of detecting regularities in a seemingly
unruly world. Given our evolved cognitive apparatus, instead of
being trapped in a maladaptive behavior, we should be able to
switch to the maximizing strategy and perseverate with the most
frequently rewarding alternative as soon as the unfeasibility of
finding any regular underlying pattern had been detected.
Here we propose an artificial life model that helps us understand
how being selected for learning structured patterns may lead to
probability matching, and how failure to learn them leads to
perseveration. Also, we demonstrate that the cognitive ability to
detect underlying patterns in a scenario of prevailing regularities
can compensate, in an evolutionary sense, for the sub-optimal
performance that results from the persistence in seeking for
patterns when none are present.
Results
In our simulations, artificial animals (animats) had to perform a
task, called the pattern matching task. It consisted of predicting
repeatedly the next element of a binary sequence formed by a
repeating string. An example string is 101, leading to the sequence
101101101… During their lives, at each time-step, animats had to
choose between 0 and 1. When their choices matched the next
element of the sequence, they won fitness points. The length of the
repeating string, and thus its difficulty to be learned, varied in
different simulations among 3, 9, 27, 81, 243 or 729 digits (six
different lengths). The frequencies of the digits 0 and 1 in the
repeating strings were always 1/3 and 2/3 respectively, and the
strings were repeated until total sequence length was 2916. We
tested twelve randomly generated strings of each length, and each
was individually presented to a group of 100 animats in separate
simulations, adding up to a total of 144 evolving scenarios (6
lengths 6 12 permutations 6 2 neural network architectures),
taking into account the two kinds of neural network architectures
employed in the simulations (see below). Although there are only
three possible strings of length 3 (011, 101 and 110), we still ran
twelve simulations by repeating four times each of the three
possible patterns.
Animats were endowed with neural networks to model a simple
nervous system. Artificial neurons were based on a simple model of
biological neurons, the perceptron [22], and were connected into
neural networks with one input node, one or two hidden layers of
four nodes, totaling four or eight hidden nodes, and one output
node (Figure 1). The number of hidden nodes correlates with
computational power, with these networks exhibiting lower (4
nodes) or higher (8 nodes) learning potentials.
Depending on the network output, we considered that the
animats had predicted the next element of the sequence to be 0 or
1. The input node delivered a feedback signal from the
environment to the neural network at time t about the animat’s
response at time t 2 1 (see Methods for details), analogous to the
feedback received by subjects in a repeated binary choice
experiment (usually a message on a computer screen – ‘‘You
won!’’ or ‘‘You lost.’’ – or a reward). The synaptic weights, which
measure the strength of the synapses between neurons, could
change through Hebbian learning, thus enabling the animat to
have different responses to the same stimuli depending on the
previous state of the network, which is necessary for the network to
repeat the patterns.
Populations of animats evolved through a genetic algorithm,
which models biological evolution according to a simplified
version of Darwin’s theory. At generation zero, one hundred
chromosomes were generated randomly (a chromosome was a set
of genes representing all the synaptic weights, biases and learning
parameters – see Methods for details). Neural networks were
constructed based on these chromosomes and the animats
performed the pattern matching task described above. The
number of correct answers was the fitness value, a measure of
evolutionary fitness and performance in the task. Then a new set of
animats – the next generation – was created through selection,
mutation and crossover. The populations evolved for 1000
generations.
The animats from the last generation performed an additional
task, which we called the random sequence task. It was similar to the
pattern matching task in that the animats had to predict the next
element of a binary sequence of length 2916, but the binary
sequence was no longer formed by a repeating string. Instead, its
elements were randomly shuffled, destroying any regularity but
keeping unchanged the digit frequencies that characterized the
repeating string sequences previously employed. Performance in
this task was compared to the performance in the pattern
matching task for all animats from the last generation of all the
simulations by calculating the prediction accuracy (the ratio of the
number of correct predictions to the total number of predictions)
and average response (or average prediction). Thus, we could test
if animats with more neurons, which were able to learn longer
patterns, were also more prone to do probability matching when
confronted with random sequences.
The results are shown in Figure 2 for both tasks (pattern matching
and random sequence). An average response close to 0.67 indicates
the animats did probability matching. When it is close to 1, it
Figure 1. Neural Network Architectures Used in the Simula-
tions. Two different neural network architectures were used in the
simulations. Networks had one input node, one or two layers of four
hidden nodes, and one output node.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034371.g001
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indicates they perseverated. To illustrate the range of strategies
employed by animats, Table 1 shows sample responses from three
individuals that belonged to the last generation.
It can be observed that animats endowed with more hidden
neurons and which evolved under input sequences composed of
shorter repetitive strings were able to learn the repeating string
and achieved a higher accuracy in the pattern matching task,
approaching a 100% correct prediction rate. But when animats
from the last generation performed the random sequence task,
their accuracy was below the optimal value of 67% that they could
have achieved if perseveration had been adopted; instead, their
accuracy was close to the 56% expected for probability matching.
Indeed, they matched the presentation probabilities of the digits in
both tasks, but achieved quite different results – a nearly optimal
accuracy in the pattern matching task and a sub-optimal one in the
random sequence task.
At the other end of the spectrum, animats endowed with fewer
hidden neurons and evolving under input sequences made up of
longer repetitive strings relative to the processing power of their
neural networks were not able to learn the repeating string. The
animats showing the fittest behavior – and thus selected along
successive generations – were those adopting a perseverating
strategy, in which the outcome 1 should be predicted with a
frequency close to 100%, reaching an accuracy slightly above
67%. When these animats were tested with a completely random
sequence, they continued to perseverate and their accuracy
remained around 67%, which is nearly optimal under these
circumstances.
Figure 2. Prediction Accuracy and Average Response for Different Pattern Lengths in Both Tasks (Pattern, Random). The prediction
accuracy and average response for different pattern lengths in both tasks: Pattern, when the sequence was formed by a repeating pattern, and
Random, when the sequence was shuffled randomly. In different simulations, the animats had 4 (figure panel A) or 8 (figure panel B) hidden nodes.
The error bars are the standard errors for n = 12. PM = Expected average response for animats that do probability matching. Max = Expected
average response for animats that perseverate. Random PM = Expected accuracy for animats that do probability matching in the random task.
Random Max = Expected accuracy for animats that perseverate in the random task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034371.g002
Evolution and Decision-Making
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In short, the better an animat performs in the pattern matching
task, the closer to probability matching it gets in the random
sequence task. Animats that perseverate in the pattern matching
task also perseverate in the random sequence task.
Discussion
In the pattern matching task, animats that learn the pattern can
always predict the next element of the sequence correctly – it is
said that they ‘‘broke the code’’ presented to them by their
environment. A superficial analysis of their behavior will lead to
the conclusion that it behaves according to a ‘‘probability
matching’’ strategy (which in fact it does, as a by-product of
breaking the code), but with a performance that reaches
optimality. An animat that is not able to learn the pattern is left
with the next best strategy, perseveration, always choosing the
most frequent outcome; in our experiment, this means that the
next element of the sequence would be correctly predicted in two
thirds of the trials, one third less than the animats that were able to
learn the pattern achieved in accuracy.
In the present pattern matching task, the theoretical difference
in accuracy between pattern decoding (leading to probability
matching) and perseveration is one third, three times larger than
the difference between probability matching and perseveration in
the random sequence task, which is only one ninth. In fact,
Figure 3 shows that, in a repeated binary choice experiment, for all
frequencies of the most majority digit except the frequency 1.0, the
difference in accuracy between pattern decoding and persevera-
tion is larger than the difference in accuracy between persever-
ation and probability matching without pattern decoding. This
result demonstrates that searching for patterns leads to larger gains
when a pattern exists and to relatively smaller losses when it
doesn’t. Thus, the ability to search for patterns would be
maladaptive only in those scenarios where there are no structured
patterns at all, this being just the case where very little can be
predicted anyway, no matter what strategy one employs. In
scenarios where structured patterns can be found, being able to
search for and learn regular underlying patterns would be far more
advantageous than perseveration.
An important feature of our simulations is that the resulting
animats are experts in reproducing one particular pattern; unlike
humans, they can’t generalize their knowledge to a larger set of
patterns of the same complexity. It is possible, however, to
consider the set of all animats with the same neural network
structure, each trained to reproduce one of twelve patterns of a
given length, as an individual having twelve networks that compete
amongst themselves to generate a response. This individual would
be capable of reproducing twelve different patterns, but it would
still perform poorly with unstructured sequences, as those do not
conform to any of the patterns it can recognize and do not contain
any regularities to be extracted. In fact, even an individual that is
able to reproduce a large number of complex patterns would
perform poorly with unstructured sequences for the same reason –
unstructured sequences do not conform to any of the patterns it
can learn. It is also possible that an individual would be able to
learn short periodic bit strings and at same time perform well when
it detects that the bit string is approximately random. Although
this possibility seems entirely plausible, given the present
constraints, we do not believe that any neural network, no matter
how complex, would detect that a bit string is approximately
Table 1. Example outcomes resulting from repetitive input patterns of length 3 and 729.
Pattern length Task Outcome
3 Pattern matching Input Sequence 10110110110110110110110110
Animat’s Prediction 10110110110110110110110110
Random sequence Input Sequence 11111111001011110000111110
Animat’s Prediction 10011101111111101101111011
729 Pattern matching Input Sequence 01111111110011100111100011
Animat’s Prediction 11111111111111111111111111
Random sequence Input Sequence 11011011011111110010011010
Animat’s Prediction 11101111111111111111111111
Example of outcomes resulting from repetitive input patterns of length 3 and 729 under two task conditions: Pattern matching (when the animat evolved in an
environment where it had to predict the next element of a sequence composed of a repetitive string of length 3 or 729), and Random sequence (when the animat, after
evolving under a repetitive string of length 3 or 729, had to predict the next element of a completely random sequence). For sequences composed by short strings (3
digit long), the animat predicts all the elements correctly (pattern matching), but does probability matching when faced with the prediction of the next element in a
shuffled random sequence. When the input sequence is composed of a very long repetitive string (729-digit long), the animat is not able to learn it, adopting a
perseveration strategy, making many (expected) mistakes; but when the same animat has to predict the next element of a randomly shuffled sequence, it perseverates
as well, achieving a better performance in comparison with the animats that had been able to learn a short-patterned sequence (3-digit long).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034371.t001
Figure 3. Accuracy for Different Strategies and Frequencies of
Majority Digit in the Repeated Binary Choice Experiment.
Predicted accuracy in the repeated binary choice experiment depend-
ing on the frequency of the majority digit and the employed strategy:
PM (probability matching without pattern decoding), Max (persevera-
tion) and Pattern (pattern decoding). For all digit frequencies except the
frequency 1.0, the difference in accuracy between pattern decoding
and perseveration (arrow A) is larger than the difference in accuracy
between perseveration and probability matching without pattern
decoding (arrow B).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0034371.g003
Evolution and Decision-Making
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34371
random if the network’s structure had evolved in an environment
where all bit strings were made up of repeating patterns the
network could learn. Distinguishing between a periodic sequence
and an approximately random one is also rather complicated. At
which point should one stop looking for patterns? What if one
decides prematurely that a sequence is random when it is, in fact,
periodic?
The animats also cannot generalize to other probability
distributions. We have chosen this particular distribution (2/3
probability for the majority digit), because (1) it is close to values
commonly used in experiments with human and biological animal
subjects (around 0.7–0.8), (2) it is close enough to the 0.75 point,
where the largest difference in performance between probability
matching and perseveration occurs in the random sequence task,
making the random task most relevant (Figure 2), (3) the selective
pressure to break the pattern rather than perseverate is high (the
difference in accuracy between the two strategies in the pattern
matching task is 1/3, close to the maximum 1/2, when the
probability is 0.5) and, most relevantly, (4) this probability value
can be expressed as a bit string of length 3 (110, 101 and 011),
which is the smallest pattern where the concept of ‘‘majority digit’’
applies. Other distributions, where the probability of the majority
digit lies close to one of the end points of the 0.5–1.0 interval, are
problematic. When the probability of the majority digit is close to
0.5, in the random sequence task, there is no difference in
performance between probability matching and perseveration; in
fact, all strategies are equivalent and therefore, if we had used such
low values, no conclusions could have been drawn from having the
animals perform the random sequence task, as all of them would
have achieved the same level of performance no matter what
strategy they employed. When the probability is close to 1, there is
little difference in performance between pattern decoding,
probability matching and perseveration in both the pattern
matching and the random sequence tasks, and so no conclusions
could have been drawn from such an experiment at all; there is
little selective pressure to break the pattern in the pattern matching
task, and we would expect our simulations to take more
generations to arrive at the point where animals that can repeat
the pattern, or to not arrive there at all, getting stuck at a local
optimum where all animals perseverate.
In humans, pattern decoding may occur consciously or not. Like
some animats, adult humans may never decide to perseverate,
unless they are explicitly taught to. The intrinsic nature of
probability matching may be illustrated by observing that people
do probability matching when they engage in more ordinary tasks
as well: determining the disease given its symptoms [16],
classifying a height measurement as belonging to a man or a
woman [23], taking the appropriate decision in response to alarms
[24], localizing auditory-visual stimuli in space [25]. It has also
been repeatedly pointed out that humans have difficulty in
recognizing randomness and, as the gambler’s fallacy discussed in
the introduction illustrates, have an incorrect intuition of it [3,7].
In any case, humans are known for their ability to detect, in the
surrounding environment, the existence of regularly recurring
patterns that might be interpreted as the underlying structure of
relevant events. If successful, one of the main benefits of this
behavior is, in addition to reacting to sudden stimuli, being also
able to predict upcoming changes in the environment and
anticipate responses to them. Therefore, the ability to build
models of the environment, according to model-based descriptions
of reinforcement learning, appears to be a crucial evolutionar-
y acquisition. In fact, Green and colleagues [26] show that a sub-
optimal, probability matching, behavior can actually be observed
in optimal Bayesian model-based learners, as long as they are
initialized with biologically reasonable but incorrect beliefs about
the underlying structure generating a sequence of events. Their
main conclusion is that ‘‘human decision making is rational and
model based and not consistent with model-free learning’’.
However, the artificial life simulations presented here have
suggested that it is not necessary to bring into play an issue of
‘‘rationality’’ versus ‘‘irrationality’’ in order to explain the non-
optimal behavior associated to probability matching. A simpler
and less involved explanation arises from the analysis of a plausible
set of evolutionary constraints under which neural machinery
responsible for prediction tasks has evolved. The present
simulations employed very simple networks as model-free learners,
bearing no prior beliefs. The non-optimality observed in the
behavior of agents endowed with higher computational power,
when confronted with poorly predictable sequences, results,
according to our interpretation, from the discrepancy between
the environment in which these agents evolved and the rather
artificial task to which they were finally submitted. It has been
observed that our cognition is subject to our need to survive in our
daily lives, until we can generate descendants, and it may not
perform optimally when the problem or the performance criterion
isn’t ecologically relevant [27]. Therefore, if (i) humans were
selected for behaving in a sufficiently patterned world and (ii)
gradually acquired a neural machinery able to link a learned
environmental pattern to successful actions, optimal actions should
not be expected when coping with less structured, weakly
predictable, environments. Under these possibly rarer and
biologically less impacting circumstances, a sub-optimal perfor-
mance – in comparison to other species – would be a fair toll to
pay in exchange for a much higher fitness when surviving in a
structured world.
In conclusion, an important reason why humans do not always
maximize their expected utility is possibly that our brain is biased
to make good decisions in the richer environment where we
evolved, but poorer decisions in other, more artificial, situations.
Although the human brain is flexible and can adapt to different
environments in the short term, the strategies that helped our
species survive in the long term also affect decision making today.
The bias discussed here is likely to affect human behavior every
time a sequence of observations is made, thus it may influence not
just the repeated binary choice experiment and its variations, but
also a wide range of experiments in decision-making and other
branches of the cognitive sciences, as well as our daily lives.
Methods
The simulation code, written in the Python and C++
programming languages, can be downloaded at http://www.
fisio.icb.usp.br/˜vinicius/downloads/probmatch.zip.
Artificial neurons were based on the perceptron model [22].
The output oj tð Þ of neuron j at time-step t was determined
according to equation 1:
oj tð Þ~tanh 5 bjz
X
i
wjioi tð Þ
 ! !
ð1Þ
where wji is the weight of the synapse between neuron j and
neuron i and bj is neuron j’s bias. The activation function, f(x) =
tanh(5x), yields a real number in the interval (21, 1), therefore all
outputs also belong to this interval. When the output was greater
than or equal to 0, we considered that the animat had predicted
the next element of the sequence to be 1, otherwise it had
predicted 0.
Evolution and Decision-Making
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The input node delivered feedback from the environment to the
neural network. The feedback was positive (+5 input) if the animat
had guessed correctly the previous element and negative (25
input) otherwise.
The neural network architecture was feedforward with totally
connected layers (Figure 1).
The synaptic weights could change through the Hebbian (or
anti-Hebbian) learning rule: When two nodes fire at the same
time, the synaptic weight between them increases (or decreases).
When they fire at different times, the synaptic weight between
them decreases (or increases). This was implemented according to
equation 2:
Dwji tð Þ~ajioj tð Þoi tð Þ ð2Þ
Where aji is the synapse’s learning parameter. When it is a positive
number, the synapse is Hebbian, and when it is a negative
number, the synapse is anti-Hebbian.
A chromosome was a set of genes representing all the synaptic
weights, biases and learning parameters, which were real numbers
in the interval [21, 1). The initial genes at generation 0 were
randomly generated with uniform distribution. One hundred
chromosomes were generated in this manner and divided into 5
populations of 20 individuals. Neural networks were constructed
based on these chromosomes and the animats performed the
pattern matching task. The fitness number, i.e., the number of
correct answers in the task, was calculated for every animat and
used to select the parents of the next generation’s individuals.
Selection occurred by tournament – two chromosomes were
selected randomly within a population and the winner became a
parent. Two parents were selected within a population to generate
each child for that population in the next generation. Child
chromosomes inherit their parents’ genes by crossover – for each
gene, a parent was randomly selected and its gene was copied to
the child chromosome – and mutation – with 5% probability, a
number from the interval [20.1, 0.1) was randomly generated
with uniform distribution and added to the gene, but always
keeping the gene in the interval [21, 1). The populations evolved
for 1000 generations, and at each 100 generations the fittest
chromosome from each population migrated to a randomly
chosen population, always keeping the number of individuals in
each population at twenty.
The animats from the last generation performed the random
sequence task in addition to the pattern matching task.
Acknowledgments
We are very grateful to Nestor Caticha and Andre´ Mascioli Cravo for
invaluable comments on the present work.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: CFDS MVCB. Performed the
experiments: CFDS. Analyzed the data: CFDS MVCB. Contributed
reagents/materials/analysis tools: CFDS MVCB. Wrote the paper: CFDS
MVCB.
References
1. Vulkan N (2000) An Economist’s Perspective on Probability Matching. Journal
of Economic Surveys 14: 101–118. Available: http://www.blackwell-synergy.
com/links/doi/10.1111/1467-6419.00106. Accessed 11 March 2012.
2. Hindmoor A (2006) Rational Choice. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 256 p.
3. Barhillel M, Wagenaar W The perception of randomness. Advances in Applied
Mathematics 12: 428–454. Available: http://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/
pii/019688589190029I. Accessed 11 March 2012.
4. Parducci A, Polt J (1958) Correction vs. noncorrection with changing
reinforcement schedules. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology
51: 492–495. Available: http://content.apa.org/journals/com/51/4/492. Ac-
cessed 11 March 2012.
5. Behrend ER, Bitterman ME (1961) Probability-matching in the fish. The
American Journal of Psychology 74: 542–551.
6. Graf V, Bullock DH, Bitterman ME (1964) Further experiments on probability-
matching in the pigeon. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 7:
151–157. Available: http://www.pubmedcentral.gov/articlerender.
fcgi?artid = 1404312. Accessed 11 March 2012.
7. Falk R, Konold C (1997) Making sense of randomness: Implicit encoding as a
basis for judgment. Psychological Review 104: 301–318. Available: http://doi.
apa.org/getdoi.cfm?doi = 10.1037/0033-295X.104.2.301. Accessed 11 March
2012.
8. Sabes PN, Jordan MI (1996) Reinforcement learning by probability matching.
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems 8: 1080–1086. Available:
https://exec.selfip.net/mirrors/bitsavers.org/pdf/mit/ai/aim/AIM-1568.pdf.
Accessed 11 March 2012.
9. Gaissmaier W, Schooler LJ (2008) The smart potential behind probability
matching. Cognition 109: 416–422. Available: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/19019351. Accessed 11 March 2012.
10. Fantino E, Esfandiari A (2002) Probability matching: Encouraging optimal
responding in humans. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology/Revue
canadienne de psychologie expe´rimentale 56: 58–63. Available: http://doi.apa.
org/getdoi.cfm?doi = 10.1037/h0087385. Accessed 11 March 2012.
11. Unturbe J, Corominas J (2007) Probability matching involves rule-generating
ability: a neuropsychological mechanism dealing with probabilities. Neuropsy-
chology 21: 621–630. Available: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/
17784810. Accessed 11 March 2012.
12. Wolford G, Miller MB, Gazzaniga MS (2000) The Left Hemisphere’s Role in
Hypothesis Formation. The Journal of Neuroscience 20: 1–4.
13. Miller MB, Valsangkar-Smyth M (2005) Probability matching in the right
hemisphere. Brain and cognition 57: 165–167. Available: http://www.ncbi.nlm.
nih.gov/pubmed/15708210. Accessed 11 March 2012.
14. Wolford G, Newman SE, Miller MB, Wig GS (2004) Searching for patterns in
random sequences. Canadian journal of experimental psychology = Revue
canadienne de psychologie expe´rimentale 58: 221–228. Available: http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/15648726. Accessed 11 March 2012.
15. Koehler DJ, James G (2009) Probability matching in choice under uncertainty:
intuition versus deliberation. Cognition 113: 123–127. Available:http://www.
ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19664762. Accessed 11 March 2012.
16. Shanks DR, Tunney RJ, McCarthy JD (2002) A re-examination of probability
matching and rational choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making 15: 233–
250. Available: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/bdm.413. Accessed 11 March
2012.
17. Niv Y, Joel D, Meilijson I, Ruppin E (2002) Evolution of Reinforcement
Learning in Uncertain Environments: A Simple Explanation for Complex
Foraging Behaviors. Adaptive Behavior 10: 5–24. Available: http://adb.
sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/10597123020101001. Accessed 11 March
2012.
18. Hardy-Vallee B (2007) Artificial life, natural rationality and probability
matching. IEEE. p. Available: http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/lpdocs/epic03/
wrapper.htm?arnumber = 4218877. Accessed 11 March 2012.
19. Seth AK (2001) Modeling Group Foraging: Individual Suboptimality,
Interference, and a Kind of Matching. Adaptive Behavior 9: 67–89. Available:
http://adb.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/105971230200900204. Accessed 11
March 2012.
20. Seth AK (2007) The ecology of action selection: insights from artificial life.
Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London Series B, Biological
sciences 362: 1545–1558. Available: http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/
articlerender.fcgi?artid = 2440771&tool = pmcentrez&rendertype = abstract. Ac-
cessed 11 March 2012.
21. Acun˜a DE, Schrater P (2012) Structure learning in human sequential decision-
making. PLoS Computational Biology 6: e1001003. Available: http://www.
pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid = 2996460&tool = pmcentrez&
rendertype = abstract. Accessed 11 March 2012.
22. Haykin S (1998) Neural Networks: A Comprehensive Foundation. 2nd ed.
Prentice Hall. 842 p.
23. Healy AF, Kubovy M (1981) Probability matching and the formation of
conservative decision rules in a numerical analog of signal detection. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Learning & Memory 7: 344–354. Available:
http://content.apa.org/journals/xlm/7/5/344. Accessed 11 March 2012.
24. Bliss JP, Gilson RD, Deaton JE (1995) Human probability matching behaviour
in response to alarms of varying reliability. Ergonomics 38: 2300–2312.
Ava i l a b l e : h t t p : / /www . c l a s s . u i d aho . e du/p s y 562/Read i n g s /
Bliss%20et%20al%20(1995).pdf. Accessed 11 March 2012.
25. Wozny DR, Beierholm UR, Shams L (2010) Probability Matching as a
Computational Strategy Used in Perception. PLoS Computational Biology 6:
Evolution and Decision-Making
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34371
e1000871. Available:http://dx.plos.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1000871. Ac-
cessed 5 August 2010.
26. Green CS, Benson C, Kersten D, Schrater P (2010) Alterations in choice behavior
bymanipulationsofworldmodel. Proceedings of theNationalAcademyofSciences
of the United States of America 107: 16401–16406. Available: http://www.
pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid = 2941269&tool = pmcentrez&
rendertype = abstract. Accessed 11 March 2012.
27. Haselton MG, Bryant GA, Wilke A, Frederick DA, Galperin A, et al. (2009)
Adaptive Rationality: An Evolutionary Perspective on Cognitive Bias. Social
Cognition 27: 733–763. Available: http://www.atypon-link.com/GPI/doi/abs/
10.1521/soco.2009.27.5.733. Accessed 11 March 2012.
Evolution and Decision-Making
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 May 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 5 | e34371
